📿 The proof to meditate on this week:

“Take a person.
They are not something unchanging, indivisible, and autonomous;
because they change and exist due to other forces.
For example, they are like a water jug.”

Sit with this proof in meditation until our next meeting.

📿 Proof for meditation for this week:

[71]

The Same & Different Self-Standing Proof

Consider a self which seems to be self-standing.

It doesn’t exist as a self which is self-standing, and which has an essentially different nature from the body & mind, “essentially different nature from the body & mind,36

Because it is neither something which is self-standing and is one and the same as the body & mind; nor is it something which is self-standing and is different from the body & mind.

It is, for example, like the antlers of a rabbit.🐇

The Tibetan text of this proof:

DANG PO NI,RANG RKYA THUB PAR SNANG BA'I BDAG CHOS CAN,PHUNG PO DANG MTSAN NYID MI MTHUN PA'IRANG RKYA THUB PA'I BDAG TU MED DE,PHUNG PO DANG RANG RKYA THUB PA'IGCIG DANG RANG RKYA THUB PA'I THA DADGANG RUNG DU MA GRUB PA'I PHYIR,DPER NA, RI BONG GI RVA BZHINZHES PA NI, 'BREL ZLA MA DMIGS PA'I RTAGS SO,,

In meditation, go through this proof before our next meeting.

Formula

Shenwang - dependent thing
Kuntak - mental construct (imaginary idea)
Yongtrup - emptiness

Emptiness (Yongtrup) = dependent thing (shenwang) - mental construct (kuntak)

The Proof That Water Pitchers
Don’t Get Their Names by Definition

[117]

“Consider this thing here, with a rounded belly.

Are you saying that—when we call it a “water pitcher”—this giving it a name doesn’t depend upon any term at all?

Why do you ask that?

Because the thing with a rounded belly is called a “water pitcher” just by its very nature: it is a “water pitcher” by definition.”

The Proof That No One Is Called
Different Names by Nature

[121]

“Let’s look next at the second reasoning.

Now let’s consider a case where we refer to a single being with a variety of different names, such as “The Powerful One,” or “Destroyer of a Hundred Cities,” or “One with a Thousand Eyes,” and so on.(53)

Are you saying that all these names apply to this being by the being’s very nature?

Why do you say that?

Because the fact that the being given these names is the one given the names is something which exists by definition.”

The Proof That One Name Is Never Applied
to Different People by Nature

[124]

“Which brings us to the third reasoning:

Let’s consider a case where the same name, “Jon,”(54) is applied to two different people.

Are you saying that this name applies to the two different people by their very nature?

Why do you say that?

Because these two different people serve as what the single name applies to by their very nature.”

Notes

(53) The Powerful One, and so on: These are different names for a single worldly god that would have been familiar to students in the author’s time who were versed in the ancient Indian literature. “Powerful One” in Sanskrit is “Ishvara”; “Destroyer of a Hundred Cities” is “Shatakratu” (sometimes also called “Indra”); and “One with a Thousand Eyes” is “Sahasraksha.”

(54) Jon: Choney Lama says “Tashi” here, which is a common Tibetan name.”

📿 This week, explore Master Asanga’s three arguments in meditation and analyze them, breaking them down step by step as we did during our meeting:

1. Why isn’t a round object a “water jug” by definition?

2. Why isn’t anyone called by a different name by nature?

3. Why doesn’t the same name apply to different people by nature?

Observe different objects and names throughout the week:

— where the dependent object itself exists;

[192]

Followers of the Independent branch though would say that these objects are both appearing to these states of mind as we described, and at the same time actually existing the way they appear to. As such, they would assert that these perceptions are unmistaken towards their objects as these objects appear to the mind. There is a vast difference in subtlety then between how the Consequence and the Independent branches describe what it is that the concept of no-self denies.

And thus we can say that, according to those who follow the Independent Branch, every existing entity in the universe is established as existing by virtue of its having made its appearance to a consistent—or we can say, unaffected—state of mind. Thus too, in this sub-school, the thing that we deny with our reasoning on this topic is any object which could exist through its own way of being, rather than being established by virtue of having made its appearance to an unaffected state of mind.

The Proof of Neither One nor Many, Independent Style

[210]

Here is the first:

Consider a sprout.

It does not exist in truth,

Because it is neither one thing which exists in truth, nor multiple things which exist in truth.

It is, for example, similar to the reflection of an object in a mirror.

The Proof of Not One, Because of Parts

[214]

Consider a sprout.

It cannot exist as one thing which exists in truth,

Because it is something which has its own parts.

The Proof of Not Many, Because Not One

[243]

The proof at this point goes like this:

Consider a sprout;

It cannot be multiple things which exist in truth,

Because there is no such thing as one thing which exists in truth.

[247]

Now the parts and the whole which possesses these parts are such that to be one is to be the other. Nonetheless, when they make their appearance to the mind, they seem as if to be one would be different from being the other—this fact is indisputable. As such, we can say that the way the thing appears, and the way it really is, are different from each other. And that’s because—despite the fact that their that’s because—despite the fact that their actual condition is that to be one is to be the other—the way they appear to exist is that to be one is to be different from the other.

[248]

This kind of situation—this very situation—is a case where the way a thing exists is false: where it is established as false because of the way it appears to the mind. This is not a case where the way the thing exists is in truth—for if something were to exist in truth, then the way it appears to us and the way it really is would have to match. If they don’t match, then the very criterion for something to exist in truth is missing.

📿 This week, explore in meditation the proof of neither one nor many and analyze it, step by step, as we did during the meeting:

1. Why can a sprout not exist as one thing which exists in truth?

2. Why can a sprout not be multiple things which exist in truth?

3. Why can the way a thing appears to the mind and the way it really is be different from each other?

Try looking at different things throughout the week:

— where there are parts;
— where the sense of a whole appears;
— where the mind perceives a thing as one independent entity;
— where the thing is similar to the reflection of an object in a mirror.

👉 Go through this proof before our next meeting.

[260]

Here is the first. We must come to an understanding of how this particular system demonstrates that every existing thing in the universe is established through our conceptions. If we do, then we can confirm that all of these entities are simply projected by these conceptions; and once we do that, we can grasp that there is nothing in the universe which is not simply projected this way.

In this way we are able to come to an understanding of how all the objects in the universe can be established as existing by force of terms, using words—so long as we refrain from seeking the thing in the object that receives the names.”

[283]

What it means for something to exist nominally is the very fact that it has been established as existing through the use of terms. And the very fact that something exists nominally means that it does not exist through any identity of its own. Until such point as we understand this idea from the bottom of our heart, we can go around talking about how nothing exists through any nature of its own, or how nothing exists in truth; but no matter how many times we repeat it in words, we are not really grasping the concept at its very depths.

18) The Seven-Part Reasoning

[323]

We do not say that a wagon
Is something other than its parts;
Nor do we say it is not.

We do not even say
That it is possessed of them,
Or that it is not its parts,

Or that the parts
Are not the wagon;
Nor is it the simple collection,
Nor can it be the outline.87

[326]

SHING RTA CHOS CAN, RANG GI YAN LAG RNAMS DANG RANG BZHIN GYIS GCIG MIN TE, YIN NA, YAN LAG RNAMS DU MA YIN PA BZHIN DU KHYOD KYANG DU MAR THAL BA DANG,

Consider a wagon.

It is not, through some nature of its own, one with its parts;

Because then there would have to be more than one wagon there—since the parts are more than one.

[327]

Or you could state the reason this way:

Because then all the parts would only be one part, since the wagon is only one.

[328]

Let’s again consider the wagon.

It is not an entity which exists through some essence of its own, and which is discrete from its parts;

Because if it were, then it would have to be observed as a discrete object isolated from its parts—as separate as a water pitcher is from a bolt of cloth—whereas in fact it is not seen to be so.”

[329]

Again, let’s consider the wagon.

It does not refer, through any nature of its own, to its parts;

Because it is not something which is, through some essence of its own, a support for its parts which is still separate from them—in the way that a metal bowl serves as the support for some yogurt.”

[330]

Consider the wagon again.

Neither does it exist as something which relies, through some nature of its own, upon its parts;

For it is not something like David88 sitting in his yak-hair tent: it is not a thing which is separate—through some essence of its own—from its parts and which relies upon them.

[331]

Yet again, consider the wagon.

Neither is it something which is, through some essence of its own, possessed of its parts.

This is because, first of all, it is not possessed of those parts in a way in which it is essentially separate from them—in the way that David is separate from a cow that he owns. Secondly, the wagon is not possessed of its parts in a way in which it is essentially one with those parts—in the way that David is possessed of his ears.

[332]

GAL TE SHING RTA'I YAN LAG TSOGS PA DANG DBYIBS SHING RTA YIN NO SNYAM NA,

“Suppose next that someone thinks to themselves, “Well then—it must be that the collection of the parts of the wagon, or its outline, are the wagon.”

[333]

And yet the former would be incorrect; for if that were the case, then the collection of all the parts of the wagon laying on the floor unassembled would also have to be a wagon.

[334]

The latter would also be incorrect; because neither the shapes of the separate parts nor the shape of the collection of these parts would ever be something we could say was a wagon.

[335]

“Now even though it’s true that—when we look for the wagon in these ways—we don’t find the wagon; nonetheless we can say that the wagon does exist, nominally speaking. As Entering the Middle Way puts it:

[336]

Admittedly it cannot exist in itself;
Nor in the everyday world
Would they ever say that the wagon
Existed in any of these seven ways.

Nonetheless, even in the world
They would say that something
Is called a wagon based on its parts—
Without questioning the matter further.89

📿 This week, explore in meditation the seven-part reasoning and analyze it step by step, as we did during the meeting:

1. Why is the wagon not something other than its parts?

2. Why is the wagon not simply its parts?

3. Why is the wagon not a support for its parts, in the way that a metal bowl serves as the support for yogurt?

4. Why does the wagon not rely on its parts as a separate thing?

5. Why is the wagon not possessed of its parts, in the way that a person owns a cow or has ears?

6. Why is the simple collection of all the parts of the wagon still not the wagon?

7. Why is the shape or outline of the parts also not the wagon itself?

Try looking at different things throughout the week:

— where there are parts;
— where a name appears;
— where the mind perceives a thing as one independent entity;
— where the thing exists only nominally, by force of a name;
— where, when we search for the thing itself among its parts, it cannot be found.

Important: this does not mean that things do not exist at all. Explore how they exist nominally, but do not exist in themselves, through any nature of their own.